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RESPONSE
THE FISCAL ILLUSION ZOMBIE:
THE UNDEAD THEORY OF GOVERNMENT
REGULATORY INCENTIVES
CHRISTOPHER SERKIN*

This is a Response to Bethany R. Berger's recent Article, The Illusion of
Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory Takings. In that Article, Professor Berger
argues against the view that governments should be forced to compensate for
regulatory burdens because they suffer from fiscal illusion and will only
internalize the costs that they, in fact, have to pay. She demonstrates that
property taxes already provide a mechanism through which governments
internalize both the costs and benefits of their property regulations, and that
compensationfor regulatory takings is therefore unnecessary and even perverse
for creating efficient regulatory incentives. This Response argues that she is
correct and that her criticismjoins many others before it. However, despite these
significant criticisms, fiscal illusion continues to inform takings theory. This
Response ultimately demonstrates that even if Professor Berger is correct, her
proposed responses do not entirely address the problem that compensation will
over-deter government regulations, and so this Response proposes both
municipal insurance and liability for regulatory inaction as potential
interventions.
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INTRODUCTION

In her recent Article, The Illusion of Fiscal Illusion in Regulatory
Takings, Professor Bethany R. Berger takes aim at fiscal illusion as a
justification for regulatory takings.' It should be an easy target; people
have shot at it before and hit it repeatedly.' And yet it somehow does
not die. The concept of fiscal illusion is based on an alluring intuition
that governments should internalize the costs of their actions, and that
failing to require compensation for regulatory burdens will lead to
over-regulation.3 As many critics have pointed out, however, the
intuition does not seem to withstand close scrutiny.' Governments do
1.

Bethany R. Berger, The Illusion ofFiscalIllusion in Regulatory Takings, 66 AM. U.

L. REv. 1 (2016).

&

2. See e.g., Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensationfor Takings: An
Economic Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REv. 569, 573 (1984) (concluding that not all regulatory
actions warrant compensation, even in the presence of "fiscal illusions"). See generally
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
ConstitutionalCosts, 67 U. Cm. L. REV. 345 (2000) (problematizing how governments
internalize costs and benefits).
3. See e.g., Berger, supra note 1, at 4 ("The efficiency argument goes like this. If
governments need not compensate owners for the loss in value caused by restricting
land use, they need not internalize the costs of their actions."); Frederic Bloom

Christopher Serkin, Suing Courts, 79 U. CI. L. REv. 553, 576 (2012) (describing the
conventional economic account of the Takings Clause); see also RICHARD A. EPSTEIN,
BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 84-86 (1993) (discussing how the just compensation
requirement could be a solution to avoiding legislation that only advances factional
interests); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, Takings, Insurance, and Michelman:
Comments on Economic Interpretationsof "Just Compensation"Law, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 269,
269-70 (1988) (describing the dual purpose of the compensation requirement of
offering "protection to private entitlements" while "disciplining the power of the
state").
4. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 377; see also, e.g., Ronit Levine-Schnur & Gideon
Parchomovsky, Is the Government Fiscally Blind? An EmpiricalExamination of the Effect of
the Compensation Requirement on Eminent-Domain Exercises, 45 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 440
(2016) ("Our findings appear to call into question the prominence of the fiscal-illusion
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not internalize costs the way private actors do, and the fit between
compensation and regulatory incentives is so imprecise as to be meaningless.
Professor Berger adds a new criticism, attacking fiscal illusion on its
own terms. She points out that property taxes are, in essence, a
mechanism by which local governments internalize both costs and
benefits and that a requirement to pay compensation will distort any
calibration between the two, putting a heavy thumb on the scale
against government action.' This is a good point and builds nicely
upon claims in the existing literature. But fiscal illusion is an undead
theory, and in the face of its persistence, it is important to consider
other ways in which the legal system can respond to the overdeterrence of compensation. These include a more robust form of
municipal insurance or, absent that, an offsetting compensation
requirement for regulatory inaction that balances out the threat of
traditional takings liability.6
Part I of this Response canvasses the critiques of fiscal illusion.
Professor Berger does some of this work herself, but it is useful to see
the full arsenal arrayed against this zombie theory. Part I is divided
between external and internal critiques, and Professor Berger's falls
into the latter category.

Part II looks at potential responses to the

problem of over-deterring government action. Building on my own
prior work, it proposes both takings for regulatory inaction and
insurance as ways of addressing the problem of under-regulation and
under-enforcement of existing regulations.

I.

THE ASSAULT ON FISCAL ILLUSION

According to Professor Berger's succinct summary, the use of the

term "fiscal illusion" in takings literature dates back to a seminal article
by Lawrence Blume and Daniel Rubinfeld, although the concept is
older.7 The phrase is invoked for the idea that "the government does
not take into account the societal costs of governmental actions unless
the government itself pays for them."' It therefore reflects the familiar

economic

intuition

that

the

law

should

force

people-or

organizations-to internalize the costs of their actions in order to

hypothesis as a single explanation for government behavior in the takings context.");
Barton H. Thompson, Jr., Conservation Options: Toward a GreaterPrivate Role, 21 VA.
ENvTL. L.J. 245, 289 (2002) (reviewing evidence and arguments challenging fiscal
illusion).
5. Berger, supra note 1, at 14-15.
6. See infraPart II (considering these alternatives).
7. Berger, supranote 1, at 9-10, 9 n.28.
8. Id. at 9.
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induce efficient decision making.' Externalized harms will tend to
encourage too much of an activity relative to its overall impact, whereas
externalized benefits will result in too little of an activity."o When it
comes to private law-property and nuisance law, for example-this
idea is intuitive and powerful." Applied to the Takings Clause," it
suggests that the government should bear the costs of its actions and
that forcing the government to pay compensation for the regulatory
harms it imposes will induce efficient regulatory incentives. 1 The
fiscal illusion theory has had enormous influence on takings theory."
However, it is not at all clear that forcing the government to pay
compensation will, in fact, force it to bear the costs of its actions in any
meaningful sense." Moreover, the theory of fiscal illusion misses
important additional dynamics affecting both regulatory and
investment incentives. Broadly, these can be grouped into external
critiques that challenge the assumptions and implications of fiscal
illusion and internal critiques that challenge fiscal illusion on its own
terms. These critiques are introduced below.

9. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 84-86 (arguing that just compensation serves this
purpose).
10. See, e.g., STEVEN SHAVIEL, FOUNDATIONS OF EcONOMIc ANALYSIS OF LAW 80
(2004) (" [I] t will be socially desirable for individuals to engage less often in acts that
cause detrimental external effects than is in their immediate self-interest, and to
engage more often in acts that engender beneficial external benefits than is in their
self-interest.").
11. See id. at 89 (providing the example of negotiations between neighbors over a
destructive dog).
12. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("private property [shall not] be taken for public use,
without just compensation").
13. See EPSTEIN, supra note 3, at 84-86 (describing the benefits of a just
compensation requirement).
14. Id.; see also Yun-chien Chang, Economic Value or FairMarket Value: What Form of
Takings CompensationIs Efficient?, 20 SUP. CT. EcON. REV. 35, 87-88 (2012) (surveying
theorists who have implicitly or explicitly endorsed fiscal illusion).
15. See, e.g., Christopher Serkin, Big Differences for Small Governments: Local
Governments and the Takings Clause, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1624, 1627 (2006) [hereinafter
Serkin, BigDifferences] ("[Public choice theorists] argue that paying compensation will
not necessarily force the government to internalize the politicalcosts of its actions, and
it is political-not monetary-costs that matter for creating efficient regulatory
incentives."); Christopher Serkin, Passive Takings: The State's Affirmative Duty to Protect
Property, 113 MICH. L. REV. 345, 361 (2014) [hereinafter Serkin, Passive Takings]
("Public-choice theorists have roundly and quite convincingly criticized this account's
simplest form by problematizing how governments internalize costs.").
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A. External Critiques
External critiques of fiscal illusion challenge the assumptions and
implications of the theory and include, for example, invoking public
choice theory, focusing on the heterogeneous sources of revenue for paying
compensation, and problematizing the resulting investment incentives."6
1.

Public choice

Key to the traditional economic account of externalities is the
assumption that people-and corporations-are rational economic
actors. Forcing private actors to bear the costs of their conduct will
lead to more efficient outcomes precisely because they are price
sensitive. The same is not necessarily true of governments. Numerous
people have argued that government actors are primarily motivated
not by the goal of maximizing wealth but instead by the goal of
maximizing political power." According to public choice theorists,
government officials act in their own self-interest and are primarily
motivated by re-election as opposed to public expenditures."
Sometimes the two are aligned, as when officials get political credit for
controlling costs, but often they are not.
In some larger units of government-such as the federal
government, states, cities and larger municipalities-political pressure
is often wielded by special interest groups more than by voters or

16. See infraSections I.A.1-I.A.3.
17. See Daniel A. Farber, Public Choice andjust Compensation, 9 CONsT. COMMENT.
279, 288 (1992) ("If we adopt a public interest theory of government, internalizing a
cost makes no difference."); Lee Anne Fennell, Taking Eminent Domain Apart, 2004
MICH. ST. L. REv. 957, 995 ("While it is a convenient fiction to suppose that
governments feel the pain of payments as much as private individuals do, the pain
from budgetary outlays is indirect, attenuated by the operation of the political
process."); see also Levinson, supra note 2, at 377 (positing that most officials do not
have to worry about the marginal effect of tax burdens); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Against
Ad Hocery: A Comment on Michelman, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1697, 1706 (1988) (" [I]f public
choices are the result of the competition of various groups for political benefits,
powerful groups will not need a constitutionally mandated takings doctrine in order
to preserve their interests."); Henry A. Span, Public Choice Theory and the Political Utility
of the Takings Clause, 40 IDAHO L. REV. 11, 22-23 (2003) (" [T]he government is not like
any other actor. It is not a simple or self-contained entity, and strictly speaking, it is
both impossible and undesirable to force it to internalize either its costs or its
benefits.").
18. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & PHILIP P. FRICKEY, LAW AND PUBLIC CHOICE: A
CRITICAL INTRODUCTION 21-24 (1991) (discussing two different model theories of how

legislators get elected: maximizing appeal to constituents, or granting special interest
groups a bigger role).
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taxpayers as a whole." Small motivated groups, facing relatively high
per capita stakes, enjoy organizational advantages over larger and
more diffuse groups.' This is important because compensation for
regulatory takings is paid out of taxpayer-funded public coffers."
Instead of forcing governments to internalize the costs of their actions,
paying compensation for burdensome regulations can spread costs
over a broad tax base, while buying the acquiescence of the one group
well situated to raise genuine political objections: the burdened
property owners. 2 However, it is not clear that a compensation
requirement will generate any meaningful political opposition to
burdensome regulations when taxpayers are not especially sensitive to
small changes in their tax bills or when the cost of this kind of
compensation is hidden in the overall budget.23 There may be
mechanisms by which regulatory takings generate political costs, but
they are much more attenuated and less direct than the standard fiscal
illusion account would suggest. 24
I have previously attempted to identify one such mechanism. In Big
Differences for Small Governments: Local Governments and the Takings
Clause, I argued-contrary to the public choice intuition-that
compensation may, in fact, force small local governments to
internalize the costs of their actions because both the costs and

19. See Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1627 (describing the effect of wellorganized special interest groups in attaining more political influence than a
disinterested majority).
20.

See NEL K KOMESAR, LAw's LIMITs: THE

RULE OF LAW AND THE SUPPLY AND

DEMAND OF RIGHTS 61 (2001) (discussing how interest groups with small numbers but
high per capita stakes have a political advantage over other groups with large numbers
but low per capita stakes); see also MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIc OF COLLEcTIVE ACTION:
PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPs 53-57 (1965) (describing the coherence
and effectiveness of small groups).
21. Serkin, Big Diferences, supra note 15, at 1639 (stating that money for
compensation is generally raised from taxpayers).
22. See Farber, supra note 17, at 282 (explaining how local tax payers and property
owners, in essence, purchase insurance against takings by paying higher taxes but then
receive compensation after a taking).
23. Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1639 ("[M] oney for compensation will
be raised from the taxpayers generally, and they constitute precisely the kind of diffuse
and unorganized majority that a mobilized special interest group's political pressure
is likely to overwhelm.").
24. See id. ("[C]ompensation ... will serve to insulate the government from the
political costs that otherwise would have been at stake. With the burdened property
owners out of the equation, no one else is well situated to generate significant political
opposition to an inefficient government action.").
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benefits of local regulations are borne by local homeowners who vote.
The benefits of regulations and government projects are reflected in
local property values, while the costs of compensation are paid largely
through property taxes and so are capitalized into property values. In
other words, local homeowners internalize both the costs and benefits
of government actions.
According to William Fischel, homeowners dominate the politics of
small local governments; they are politically active, benefit from social
networks, and are highly attentive to local property values.
As a
result, local officials are closely attuned to these "homevoters," who in
turn are motivated primarily by preserving their property values.28 Put
this all together, and the traditional cost internalization story of
compensation for regulatory takings actually works surprisingly well in
small local governments. Costs and benefits are both captured in
property values, which become a kind of political yardstick for local
government success.
This argument, however, was not intended to repudiate the public
choice criticism of just compensation-quite the opposite.
In
defending the traditional economic account of compensation's effects
for small local governments of a particular character, this argument
reinforced the public choice critique elsewhere.' Identifying the
mechanism for feedback between compensation and political pressure
in small local governments reveals the absence of such a mechanism in
larger governments-or in governments not dominated by Professor
Fischel's homevoters. Moreover, I argued that even in homevoter
jurisdictions, local officials may actually be risk averse, and so the effect
of compensation may be to deter government actions that would, in

25. Id. at 1665 ("The relationship between homeowners, property values, and
property taxes at the local level means that requiring local governments to pay just
compensation will force them to internalize at least some of the costs of their
actions.").
26. Id. ("[F] orcing local governments to pay for land use regulations will, in fact,
force them to internalize both the costs and benefits of their actions. The close
relationship between property taxes and property values-whether use value or market
value-places both the burdens and benefits of government actions on local
homeowners.").
27.

WILUAM A. FIsCHEL, THE HOMEVOTER HYPOTHESIs 4 (2001).

28. See Serkin, BigDiferences, supra note 15, at 1648 (suggesting that homeowners'
incentive to control local politics is driven by their desire to preserve the value of their
property); see also FIsCHEL, supra note 27, at 88-89 (stating that homeowners pay close
attention to local policies because they affect the value of their property).
29. See Serkin, Big Diferences, supra note 15, at 1661-62 (describing differences
between smaller local governments and larger governments).

1440

AMERICAN UNIVERsYIY IAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:1433

fact, have been net beneficial."o While I return to the problem of risk
aversion in greater detail below, the more fundamental insight here is
that public choice theory challenges proponents of fiscal illusion to
develop a mechanism by which economic costs are translated into
political costs. It may be possible to develop such a theory in specific
regulatory contexts, but overall, the public choice criticism of fiscal
illusion is quite trenchant.
2.

The problematicsources of revenue

The political ramifications of compensation also depend upon how
a government raises revenue. The idea of fiscal illusion implicitly
assumes that the government is a kind of unitary economic actor.
Facing the prospect of compensation will force the government to
make trade-offs, assess opportunity costs, and make more rational
decisions about regulatory priorities. But the effect-and, therefore,
the politics-of compensation will be quite different depending on the
sources of revenue.
This is most starkly on display in Professor William Fischel's granular
account of Detroit's decision to condemn property in the famous case
of Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit." While Poletown
involved eminent domain and not regulatory takings, the dynamics
surrounding revenue are the same.32 According to his analysis, one of
the central features of the Poletown case was the federal government
As a result, in
paying the lion's share of Detroit's land assembly.
Professor Fischel's colorful language, "opposing the Poletown project
looked like shooting Santa Claus."' Generalizing from this specific

30. See id. at 1666 (stating that local governments are more risk averse than larger
governments); see also Christopher Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, 111 Nw. U. L. REV.
75, 82-88 (2016) [hereinafter Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims] (arguing against the
theoretical claim that local governments are risk neutral because they can always raise
taxes).
31. 304 N.W.2d 455 (Mich. 1981), overruled by Cty. of Wayne v. Hathcock, 684
N.W.2d 765, 787 (Mich. 2004); see William A. Fischel, The PoliticalEconomy ofPublic Use
in Poletown: How Federal GrantsEncourageExcessive Use ofEminent Domain, 2004 MICH.
ST. L. REv. 929, 943 (2005) [hereinafter Fischel, PoliticalEconomy].
32. 304 N.W.2d at 457. Professor Berger appropriately distinguishes eminent
domain from regulatory takings on the grounds that the government actually ends up
with title to the real property in eminent domain. Berger, supra note 1, at 12-13. That
distinction is irrelevant to observations here about the distorting effects on
government incentives based upon the sources of municipal revenue.
33. Fischel, PoliticalEconomy, supranote 31, at 943 ("The largest source of funds for
the project, covering almost half of its total cost, was a $100 million loan from HUD.").
34. Id. at 948.
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example: the source of.the funding for compensation undoubtedly
affects the political economy of local decision making.
These potentially distorting effects do not depend on federal or state
earmarking either. The dynamics surrounding revenue sources can be
important more broadly. Consider a local government that levies an
uneven property tax. New York City, for example, treats single-family
homes much more favorably than apartments for tax purposes." The
result is that owners of multi-million dollar brownstones may pay far
less in taxes than owners of equivalently valuable apartments." Paying
compensation from property tax revenue in New York City means that
taxpayers unevenly bear the actual burdens of compensation. Add
other sources of revenue, like sales or income tax, and the connection
between the award of compensation and the sources of funding becomes
increasingly tenuous." The sources of revenue mean that the costs of
compensation are, in fact, spread unevenly throughout ajurisdiction.
Some might object that money is fundamentally fungible and the
source of revenue does not matter for the underlying claim of fiscal
illusion. The government will pay out from a limited pile of money,
and that is enough. The problem runs deeper, however, because of
the mismatch between regulatory costs and benefits. As sources of
municipal revenue diversify, there is an ever-increasing divergence
between the benefits of a local regulation and the source of revenue to

35. SeeDistributionofthe Burden ofNew York City's Property Tax, FURMAN CTR. FOR REAL
EST. AND
URB. POL'Y
(2011),
http://furmancenter.org/files/publications/

Distribution-of theBurden_ofNewYork_Citys_.PropertyTax_1

.pdf

[https://perma.cc/K4EZ-PNR2] [hereinafter Distribution of the Burden] (explaining
the range of tax payment in New York City); see also Shifting the Burden: Examining the
Undertaxation of Some of the Most Valuable Properties in New York City, FURMAN CTR. FOR
REAL EsT. AND URB. POL'Y (July 2013),
http://furmancenter.org/files/

FurmanCenterShiftingtheBurden.pdf [https://perma.cc/7HY6-25WC]

(describing

persistent under-taxation of some of New York City's most valuable property); Ronda
Kaysen, Property Tax Envy: Property Taxes, Tax Abatements, Affordable Housing, N.Y. TIMEs:
ASK REAL EST. (Oct. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/2014/10/26/realestate/
property-taxes-tax-abatements-affordable-housing.html (comparing apartments and

larger, multifamily buildings that are assessed at 45% of their value to single-family
homes or properties with no more than three units that are assessed at 6% of their
value).
36. See Distribution of the Burden, supranote 35, at 8 ("Although the burden of the
property tax is spread widely, it is not distributed equally .. . New York City's property
tax system provides for radically different tax treatment of equally valuable properties,
depending on the use of the property and the form in which it is owned.").
37. See, e.g., Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1653 (summarizing different
sources of local government revenue).
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pay compensation.' Zoning changes, for example, will easily translate
into property values, and so property taxes are at least a reasonable
nexus for balancing costs and benefits (even if both costs and benefits
are unevenly distributed-a point taken up again below)." But, if
neighbors enjoy the benefits of a downzoning while the costs are borne
primarily by businesses (paying sales tax), out-of-town visitors (paying
a hotel tax), or others, then compensation does not create even a
rough balancing of costs and benefits. It simply pits two groups against
each other staking out clear winners and losers. And this is even before
problematizing how local governments internalize benefits.
3.

Investment incentives

Another criticism of fiscal illusion is the effect of compensation on
property owners' investment incentives.4 ' As Professors James Krier
and Michael Heller recognized in an insightful treatment of the
problem, the compensation rule that generates efficient regulatory
incentives may not be the same rule that generates efficient investment
Whether compensation is important to force the
incentives.
government to internalize the costs of its actions, the promise of
compensation may have perverse effects on property owners by
inducing a form of moral hazard.
38. See id. at 1652-53 (describing changes in sources of local government
revenue).
39. See, e.g., William K Jaeger, The Effects of Land-Use Regulations on Property Values,
36 ENvTL. L. 105, 106, 112-17 (2006) (discussing effects of zoning and land use
controls on property values).
40. See, e.g., Abraham Bell, NotJust Compensation, 13J. CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 29,
33 (2003) (describing the moral hazard problem); Blume & Rubinfeld, supranote 2,
at 577; Steve Calandrillo, Eminent Domain Economics: Should "Just Compensation" Be
Abolished, and Would "Takings Insurance" Work Instead?, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 451, 493-94
(2003) (summarizing the treatment of the incentive issue in economic literature); Eric
Kades, Avoiding Takings "Accidents": A Tort Perspective on Takings Law," 28 U. RICH. L.
REv. 1235,1242-43 (1994) (comparing the taking clause and basic casualty insurance);
Louis Kaplow, An Economic Analysis ofLegal Transitions, 99 HARV. L. REV. 509, 532 n.61
(1986) (identifying the problem of investment incentives); Thomas Miceli & Kathleen
Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should Compensation Be Paid?, 23J. LEGAL STuD.749,
756 (1994).
41. See Michael A. Heller &James E. Krier, Deterrence and Distribution in the Law of
Takings, 112 HARv. L. REv. 997, 998 (1999) (highlighting Phillips v. Washington Legal
Foundationand the Supreme Court's failure to shed light on the Constitution's "just
compensation" clause).
42. For a leading account of moral hazard, see generally Tom Baker, On the
Genealogy of Moral Hazard, 75 TEx. L. REV. 237 (1996), which challenges the traditional
ideas of moral hazard defined as "the tendency for insurance against loss to reduce
incentives to prevent or minimize the cost of loss."
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In its simplest form, the moral hazard problem in regulatory takings
is that compensation can be viewed as a kind of mandatory insurance
against the most significant costs of regulatory change.4" If that
insurance were to become more widely available-as the logic of fiscal
illusion compels-then it would allow property owners to ignore risks
that they should, in fact, consider." Property owners should not
ignore foreseeable risks of regulatory changes when making their
investment decisions. For example, imagine owners of property near
an airport deciding whether to develop condominiums or a shopping
mall." Imagine that the condos are the more valuable use but that
there is a chance the FAA may re-route airplanes directly over the
property. The property would then be much less valuable for
residential than commercial uses. Discounting the expected value of
the various choices by the risk of airplane overflights, the shopping
mall might become the more valuable use.
The promise of
compensation for such a regulatory change would allow the property
owners to ignore those risks, however." Even though the condos are
suddenly the less valuable choice because of the possibility of increased
airplane noise, the developer-and, to some extent, even purchasers
of the units-may be indifferent so long as they receive compensation
for this diminished utility. Better, of course, would be for the developer to
take this risk into account Ignoring the risk will create deadweight costs
and also increase the costs of compensation to the government.
This problem led Professors Krier and Heller to propose an
innovative solution: disaggregating the amount the government has
to pay from the amount that property owners receive.
Their
approach would effectively allow compensation to be calibrated to
address fiscal illusion on the one hand, and to address moral hazard
on the other." While theirs is a creative approach, it is most certainly
not the law. It also reveals-at least implicitly-that addressing fiscal
43. Kyle D. Logue, Legal Transitions, RationalExpectations, and Legal Progress, 13 J.
CONTEMP. LEGAL IssuEs 211, 216-18 (2003).
44. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 593-94.
45. Versions of this example are ubiquitous in the literature. Some examples
include: Lawrence Blume, et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be
Paid?, 99 Q.J. EcoN. 71, 73-74 (1984); Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 586; David
A. Dana, NaturalPreservationand the Race to Develop, 143 U. PA. L. REv. 655, 678 (1995);
Miceli & Segerson, supranote 40, at 756-57.
46. Blume & Rubinfeld, supra note 2, at 618 ("Knowing that full insurance is
available, private investors will tend to put too much of their physical capital on 'risky'
land, and too little on land that will be unaffected by the government decision.").
47. See Heller & Krier, supranote 41, at 997-98.
48. See id. at 1005-13 (surveying possible responses).
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illusion can create different problems for investment incentives, unless
there are radical changes to the compensation regime.
B. Internal Critiques
In addition to these external critiques, scholars also challenge the
internal mechanisms of the fiscal illusion theory. These focus on the
problem of lumpy costs, the lack of symmetry between costs and
benefits, and temporal problems."
1.

Lumpy costs

Even taking the fiscal illusion story seriously on its own terms,
Professor Daryl Levinson demonstrated that the heterogeneous
distribution of costs and benefits can produce inefficient outcomes.
This is true even under the hyper-stylized conditions that typically drive
examples of fiscal illusion."
Scholars often explain fiscal illusion by imagining a stylized
municipality with an arithmetically simple number of people, say 100
property owners choosing whether to downzone (or otherwise
burden) one individual property owner." Readers are asked to
imagine that the regulation will impose $1,000 (or some arbitrary
number) worth of harm and conclude that if the regulation is worth at
least $10 per property owner, then it is efficient. In this story,
compensation is said to put the costs and benefits to the test. If
property owners must pay the $1,000 of regulatory harm, they will only
support the regulation if it is worth at least $10 per owner.5
Professor Levinson, however, demonstrated the problem with this
analysis by adding an additional but realistic wrinkle: that the benefits
are spread unevenly among the property owners.' In a majoritarian
political system, using the same example as above, if fifty-one of the
100 property owners value the regulation at $11, and forty-nine of
them value the regulation at only $1, then the government will still
adopt the regulation even though it generates only $610 of benefits
and $1,000 worth of costs. 5 Those who value the regulation more can

49. See infra Sections I.B.1-I.B.3.
50. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 364-66.
51. Id. at 363-66.
52. Id. at 364.
53. See id. at 364 (describing but then critiquing this traditional formulation).
54. Id. at 365.
55. Id. ("[In a stylized jurisdiction with ten citizens,] consider a more likely case:
the proposed regulation will benefit each of citizens 1-6 (the members of the
minimum winning coalition) by $2000, while costing each of citizens 7-10 $4000.
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spread the costs over the entire tax base.
Therefore, even a
compensation requirement in a perfectly representative government will
not necessarily produce efficient results if the benefits are too lumpy.
Notice that this calculation relies on a slightly different and more
sophisticated version of the fiscal illusion claim. Instead of viewing the
government as some autonomous actor with its own set of preferences,
it assumes a representative government.
Here, determining a
government's regulatory incentives requires understanding the
priorities of a majority of voters. The government's motives are then a
reflection of the polity's preferences, which includes the possibility of
interest groups and heterogeneous voter preferences.
This is different from public choice theory, of course, which focuses
on the preferences and incentives of individual government officials."
Public choice theory therefore accounts for minoritarian rule, whereby
local officials do not follow majority preferences but instead the
preferences of well-organized special interest groups.5 ' Levinson's
account, in contrast, remains majoritarian, but more realistically so by
recognizing that different people and different groups may value
government actions differently. This does not apply only to the cost
side of the ledger, however. Adding an explicit focus on regulatory
benefits introduces an additional critique.
2.

The problem of symmetry

Professor Levinson-in the same article discussed above-offers a
new gloss on the familiar public choice critique.58 Fiscal illusion
assumes that governments only internalize costs that have a direct
budget impact, and yet, seems to assume that governments internalize
benefits politically or through some other opaque mechanism.59 In

Citizens 1-6 will support the regulation because it leaves them better off by $400
($2000 in direct benefits minus one-tenth of $16,000, or $1600, in compensation
taxes), and the inefficient regulation will therefore pass. We should expect most
proposed regulations with redistributive effects to resemble this example, for
supermajority coalitions will always have the incentive to expel all members in excess
of a bare majority.").
56. Cf Span, supra note 17, at 22-23 (arguing that "[u] nless compensation is made
to come out of the personal assets of government officials, it is unclear why having to
pay it would act as a deterrent").
57. See Komesar, supranote 20, at 61 (noting that high stakes incentivize political
action in small special interest groups).
58. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 345 (applying public choice models to analyze
government's asymmetrical incentive structure between costs and benefits).
59. Id. at 350 ("If government does not fully internalize the costs of takings unless
it must spend its revenues to pay compensation, then why should we expect
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short, fiscal illusion presumes a curious asymmetry in how
If a government
governments internalize costs and benefits.
internalizes benefits without being able to capture them in its balance
sheet, then the same should be true of costs as well. Traditional fiscal
illusion analysis focuses only on regulatory costs.
The implicit answer in traditional fiscal illusion analysis is that
governments internalize benefits politically. The motivation for a
regulation comes from the benefits it will produce-benefits that
apparently flow to local property owners and groups with political
power. But this devolves quickly into the familiar public choice
critique described above because, if political pressure motivates
governments to generate regulatory benefits, the same forces should
motivate governments to avoid regulatory harms."o While the politics
of harms and benefits may be different in any particular setting-more
diffuse or more concentrated, or even falling on groups with more or
less political force-there is no reason in the abstract to think that
governments internalize harms and benefits in fundamentally
different ways."' In other words, if governments internalize benefits
without any immediate impact on the budget, then the same should
be true of costs as well. Compensation is therefore unnecessary, at least
for the purpose of inducing efficient regulatory incentives.
The argument for symmetry can cut in the other direction as well.
If the government internalizes costs through its budget, then it must
also be allowed to recover regulatory benefits for precisely the same
reason. But what would it mean for governments to capture the
benefits of their regulations? In the strongest form, it could look like
the radical proposal for "givings," allowing the government to charge
the beneficiaries for regulatory largess.6" That, of course, is not the
government to fully internalize the benefits of takings when it does not receive them
in the form of revenues?").
60. Cf id. at 350 ("[T] he takings literature mysteriously assumes that government
policymakers discount social costs that are not translated into budgetary expenditures,
but do not similarly discount the social benefits derived from government
programs.... One searches the takings literature in vain for some explanation of this
puzzling asymmetry.").
61. But see Michael H. Schill, Intergovernmental Takings and just Compensation: A
Question of Federalism, 137 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 860 n.116 (1989) ("[S]everal empirical
studies indicate that governments overestimate benefits and underestimate costs
generated by public programs.").
62. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Givings, 111 YALE L.J. 547, 549, 590
(2001) (claiming beneficiaries of givings, or government distribution of property,
should compensate the government when deemed "chargeable"); see also Daniel D.
Barnhizer, Givings Recapture: FundingPublic Acquisition ofPrivatePmperty Interests on the
Coasts, 27 HARv. ENvrL. L. REv. 295, 298 (2003) (proposing that government monetize
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law."
Alternatively, and more plausibly, some scholars have
recognized that property taxes provide a mechanism by which local
governments can capture at least some of a regulation's benefits.' If
those benefits are capitalized into property values, then they will
produce greater property tax revenue. From the government's
perspective, costs are paid through compensation and benefits are
recaptured over time through increased property taxes. But a
moment's reflection reveals that this is still not symmetrical; property
tax revenues may indeed allow a government to capture some
regulatory benefits but not their full worth because property taxes are
levied as a small percentage of property values.
3.

Berger and the temporal problem of taxes

This final observation leads nicely into Professor Berger's
contribution, which makes a new version of the symmetry argument.
Professor Berger argues that property taxes are the mechanism by
which local governments internalize both benefits and costs.'
Regulations that increase local property values will increase tax
revenue, and regulations burdening property will have the opposite
effect.' Importantly, however, this mechanism for cost internalization
occurs even without a compensation requirement.
Clearly,
governments internalize costs and benefits through tax revenue to a
different extent than the property owners experience them." The
benefits conferred on coastal property through government action to use as a credit
for future acquisition or condemnation of that property).
63. Levinson, supra note 2, at 350 n.12 ("Government sometimes does extract
payments from the beneficiaries of its programs through special assessments and user
fees, but probably not often enough for cash returns to be viewed as a substantial factor
motivating government behavior on the benefits side."); see also Saul Levmore, just
Compensation andjust Politics, 22 CoNN. L. REv. 285, 290-93 (1990) (describing the
various tools that governments can use to finance their projects).
64. See Vicki Been & Joel C. Beauvais, The Global Fifth Amendment? NAFTA's
Investment Protections and the Misguided Quest for an International "Regulatory Takings"
Doctrine, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 30, 97 (2003) ("If, for example, a local government passes a
land use restriction that benefits neighboring land by either protecting or increasing
its value, the government will capture at least some of that avoided loss (or gain)
through property taxes."); see also Serkin, BigDifferences, supra note 15, at 1646 ("Local
governments therefore internalize costs and benefits through property values and
property taxes.").
65. Berger, supra note 1, at 16.
66. Id. at 27 ("In general, governments will feel the positive or negative impact of
land use measures through tax revenues.").
67. Id. at 14 ("The cost experienced by the government is, of course, not the same
as that experiences by the property owner. But neither is the benefit. Both the cost
and the benefit reflect the percentage of value reached by taxation . . . .").
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translation from property values to property taxes occurs through the
tax rate and is mediated by imperfect assessments.' But fiscal illusion
is concerned only with regulatory incentives, and so long as costs and
benefits are internalized to the same extent, it does not matter whether
both are fully or only partially borne by the government.
Professor Berger, therefore, argues that compensation is not only
unnecessary to induce efficient regulatory incentives, but that it will
have the perverse effect of heavily weighting the cost side of the
ledger.' Governments imposing regulatory burdens will not only bear
the cost through lower property tax revenue, they will also have to pay
a lump-sum in compensation that must be recouped slowly through
the increased property taxes from benefitted property."o Instead of
inducing efficient regulatory incentives, compensation in this view is a
heavy thumb on the scale against even net beneficial regulations.
Professor Berger's argument really contains two distinct but
intertwined attacks on fiscal illusion. The first is simply to observe the
symmetry of costs and benefits reflected in property taxes, and
therefore the "additional" cost that compensation represents." The
second is the problem of an inter-temporal imbalance, whereby costs
of compensation are borne all at once while benefits through property
taxes are achieved only slowly, over time." It is important to keep these
conceptually separate.
The symmetry argument is elegant and serves as an effective riposte
to the conventional articulation of fiscal illusion that views the
government as its own independent entity, exclusively concerned with
its own budget. However, it is not entirely responsive to the kind of
more nuanced articulation offered by Professor Levinson, for
example, who views the government as the conduit for expressing
voter preferences.7 1 It is not the government that must internalize
costs and benefits, but rather the voters who fund the government.
Forcing the government to pay is merely the mechanism for requiring
regulatory winners to bear the costs-through their taxes-of paying
off the losers in the regulatory process.

68. Id. at 17-19.
69. Id. at 14-16.
70. See id. at 15 (offering an example demonstrating the protracted time period
necessary for a government to recover revenue through property tax increases).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. See supratext accompanying note 56 (suggesting that government officials are
motivated by self-interest and re-election rather than purely budgetary concerns).
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Here, Professor Berger's argument for symmetry becomes less
conclusive. In this kind of majoritarian polity, property taxes do not
necessarily counterbalance in the way she suggests. For example, in a
stylized municipality, imagine a measure that will increase the property
value of 100 property owners by $100 each (for a total benefit of
$10,000). However, it does so at the expense of a single burdened
property owner, who will see a reduction in her property value of
$50,000. If the property tax rate is 5%, then property taxes will
simultaneously increase by $500 per year (to reflect the increase in
property value of the 100 benefitted properties) and decrease by
$2,500 per year (to reflect the diminution in value of the burdened
property), for a net loss of $2,000 per year.
So far so good. Focusing on the government as its own entity, with
its own incentives, the government will not enact this measure even in
the absence of a compensation requirement, just as Professor Berger
suggests. But, focusing on votes instead of the budget makes the story
more complicated. Now, 100 taxpayers stand to benefit by $100, and
so would presumably vote in favor of the measure, even though the
costs to the individual burdened by the measure are far greater than
the aggregate benefits.
Even in a perfectly representative
government-putting aside public choice theory-voters in this
example will still approve an inefficient government regulation that
benefits more people than it burdens.
However, maybe the analysis should not stop there. Focusing on the
taxpayers instead of on the government means taking into account that
taxpayers will also have to make up the foregone tax revenue resulting
from the reduction in value of the regulated property. In this example,
the 100 benefitting property owners will presumably have to cover the
$2,000 reduction in annual property taxes to the tune of an extra $20
per person. Is the $100 increase in underlying property values worth
another $20 per year in taxes? Depending on discount rates, probably
not. But this is the muddier analysis that needs to be navigated as the
focus shifts from the government fisc for its own sake to the taxpayers
footing the bill.
Add a more heterogeneous tax base-as Levinson does-and it
becomes murkier still. Now imagine that the 100 benefited taxpayers
are a majority, but nevertheless a subset of 150 taxpayers in town. And
imagine further that they own only 25% of the property tax base. In
other words, 75% of all local property by value is owned by the
remaining fifty people, and they will not benefit from the measure at
all. Property tax revenue will still decrease by net $2,000 per year, but
the 100 benefited property owners will only have to contribute $500 to
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cover the shortfall. The benefited property owners will have to pay an
additional $5 apiece in taxes-a price they may happily pay for the
$100 benefit.74 The wealthier taxpayers will have to contribute the
extra $1,500 for a measure they do not value. And yet, in a majoritarian
system, the measure may now pass.
It is easy to play with the numbers and produce all sorts of different
results. Nevertheless, the overall point is easy enough to see: property
taxes will not necessarily do the work Professor Berger suggests once
costs and benefits are unevenly distributed, even in a perfectly
representative political system. As Levinson points out, this concern
exists with regards to a more traditional compensation analysis--one
not mediated through property tax rates. Professor Berger's account
fares no worse,75 but it does reveal that her argument for the symmetry
of costs and benefits in the property tax system falters when tax
burdens and regulatory benefits are unevenly distributed.
While this focus on the taxpayer instead of the government
undercuts some of Professor Berger's symmetry argument, it actually
reinforces her other concern that the payment of compensation
creates a lump-sum cost, whereas regulatory benefits are spread out
slowly over time.7 ' The inter-temporal mismatch between costs and
benefits can create a problem for taxpayers who may face a sudden
spike in their property tax bills or for government officials faced with
immediate cash flow pressures. Indeed, this is a profound problem for
regulatory incentives.
II.

ADDRESSING THE TEMPORAL MISMATCH

It should not be. If the concern is spikey costs and inter-temporal
mismatches between costs and benefits, there is a standard recipe for
responses that includes both debt and insurance.77

As it turns out,

neither debt nor insurance is an effective response, but the reasons are

not obvious and are worth considering in some detail.

74. In fact, they will pay $5 per year to reflect their increased property values, plus
an additional $12.50 to make up the shortfall, for a total of $17.50 per year.
75. See Levinson, supra note 2, at 345, 365, 375 (demonstrating the stilted nature
of a cost benefit analysis in a majoritarian political regime).
76. See Berger, supranote 1, at 15.
77. See Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, supra note 30, at 83-84 (illustrating that
local municipalities may use either debt or insurance interchangeably as a mechanism
to deflect sudden spikes in property tax rates); see also Amy v. Puelz & Robert Puelz,
Managerial Use of Debt to Fund Municipal Government Risks, 28 DECISION Scl. 745, 746
(1997) (noting that the common municipal approach to insurance consists of bonds
for moderate losses and formal insurance for extreme circumstances).
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Regulatory takings liability is hardly unique in imposing large onetime costs that can only be repaid over time. Indeed, this bears a
surprising similarity to infrastructure spending, say on a new school,
library, or bridge.7 ' These sorts of investments also create problems of
inter-temporal mismatch where the government must incur all of the
up-front costs, but benefits accrue far into the future.7 ' This is precisely
the same dynamic that Professor Berger identified that prevents
efficient or net-beneficial regulations."
Those regulations create
immediate costs but long-term benefits through improved regulations.
When it comes to infrastructure, there is a straightforward solution to
realigning those costs and benefits over time: debt financing." By
paying for a school expansion or other capital investment with municipal
bonds, the government can-in effect-spread the costs of the
investment over time. Taxpayers in the future, who will continue to
benefit from the investment, will also have to pay their share by continuing
to service the debt. This is the normative justification for financing
infrastructure with debt in order to align costs and benefits over time.82
There is no reason in the abstract why the same should not be
possible for regulatory takings liability. Faced with a large up-front cost
that will generate long-term regulatory benefits, the government could
float a bond to cover the costs of compensation." The problem of
spikey costs would disappear, and regulatory incentives would therefore
become realigned. The possibility of financing regulatory takings
compensation should largely undermine Professor Berger's concern.

78. See generally Christopher Serkin, Public Entrenchment Through Private Law:
BindingLocalGovernments, 78 U. CI. L. REv. 879, 906 (2011) [hereinafter Serkin, Public
Entrenchment] (explaining that the government may use debt to fund various types of
large-scale projects).
79. Id. at 879, 906 (describing municipal use of bonds as a mechanism to
circumvent temporal mismatch by diverting the burden of initial investment costs to
future tax payments).
80. See Berger, supra note 1, at 34, 37 (explaining that the requirement for full
compensation prevents government from enacting land use regulations because the
benefits will not equalize over time).
81. See Serkin, PublicEntrenchment, supra note 78, at 961 ("A government's floating
a municipal bond to fund infrastructure development ... allocates to the future the
obligation to pay a fair share of the cost of the infrastructure, given the intertemporal
dispersion of benefits.").
82. Id. ("Certain investments that a local government undertakes will create
positive externalities into the future, and debt simply aligns costs and benefits.").
83. See Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, supra note 30, at 83 ("Faced with a
significant liability-whether a legal judgment or otherwise-a local government
could float a bond to cover the cost."); see also Puelz & Puelz, supra note 77, at 746
(stating that debt is the municipality's most commonly used alternative to insurance).
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While this makes good sense conceptually, there are doctrinal and
practical problems with this approach. For one, almost every state
limits municipal indebtedness, usually to some fraction of overall
assessed property value in the jurisdiction." The reason is that
municipal debt raises a particular kind of inter-temporal problem by
allowing local officials to raise money today while pushing the burdens
into the future. This is appropriate when the investment creates longterm benefits, but it makes much less sense where the money is used
for more speculative ventures or simply to cover short-term operating
costs." In those instances, public choice theory predicts that local
officials will be insufficiently attentive to future concerns; they will reap
the political benefits of having more money today, while forcing future
taxpayers to bear most of the costs. State law limiting municipal debt
should be seen as a response to this problem."
Municipal debt limits, however, pose a problem for financing
compensation awards. Additional borrowing may simply not be
available for some governments. And even where it is, incurring debt
to pay compensation for regulatory takings claims still imposes
significant opportunity costs because less borrowing authority will be
available for other purposes. In short, then, municipal debt is not a
cure-all to compensation's temporality problem.
Debt-were it to be available-is a way of smoothing costs over time
ex post. It converts the need for a large one-time payment into a
smoother stream of payments into the future. 7 But there is another
mechanism that serves precisely the same purpose ex ante- municipal
insurance. Insurance amounts to a stream of payments ahead of time
to prevent having to pay a substantial lump-sum all at once. Insurance
and debt are, in effect, flip sides of this same coin."

84. Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, supra note 30, at 84 ("[S]tate law often caps the
amount of debt that a municipality can incur."); see also Serkin, Public Entrenchment,
supranote 78, at 906 (discussing municipal debt limits).
85. In the late nineteenth century, local governments engaged in a kind of
spending arms race to try to attract railroads. While this worked in some instances,
and created a new economic engine, many municipalities lost out after already
investing vast sums of money for economic gains that never appeared. See Serkin,
PublicEntrenchment, supranote 78, at 906-07.
86. See id. at 925-26 (discussing debt limits as a response to the entrenching
problem of municipal debt).
87. See Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, supra note 30, at 84 ("Just as insurance
transforms the risk of spiky losses into more predictable but certain ex ante costs, debt
does the same thing ex post.").
88. See id.
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All but the largest municipalities have insurance that provides more
or less comprehensive protection against a wide range of losses."
Typical policies include coverage for property loss as well as for legal
liability.90 Liability coverage includes coverage not only for tort claims,
but also for deliberate policy choices under a municipality's Errors and
Omissions (E&O) policy." Where insurance is in place, Professor
Berger's concerns about the lumpiness of compensation awards simply
do not apply.
In fact, however, municipal liability insurance for regulatory takings
claims does not exist for most municipalities.9 In a strange lacunae in
insurance markets, private insurance for regulatory takings falls within
a nearly ubiquitous exclusion for "inverse condemnation."" Inverse
condemnation is, in effect, regulatory takings by another name, and
the effect of the exclusion is to eliminate the insurer's duty both to
indemnify and defend regulatory takings claims." In previous work, I
demonstrated that the exclusion was difficult to understand in light of
existing insurance coverage for § 1983 claims more generally and for
other types of claims against local governments." I argued that the
absence of insurance will induce smaller, risk averse governments to
under-regulate or under-enforce existing regulations, precisely
because of the inability to smooth the costs of both compensation and
litigation associated with regulatory takings claims." Count this, then,
as reinforcing Professor Berger's observation. Insurance would be a
response to her concern but, in fact, it is largely unavailable.
89.

See id. at 92.

90. See id. at 93-100 (describing typical municipal insurance coverage); cf John
Rappaport, How PrivateInsurers Regulate Public Police, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1539, 1552-54
(2017) (positing reasons why a government, although "risk neutral," might choose to
purchase municipal liability insurance).
91. See Serkin, Insuring Takings Claims, supra note 30, at 96-97 (defining E&O
policies as insurance against "wrongful acts" committed by municipal actors).
92. See id. at 110 (identifying Minnesota as the only state that offers insurance for
regulatory takings as part of its municipal liability pool).
93. Id. at 107 (defining inverse condemnation as "an eminent domain proceeding
triggered by the property owner instead of the government" that acts as a "mechanism
for vindicating a regulatory takings claim in state court"); see id. at 105-07 (discussing
inverse condemnation exclusion).
94. Id. at 106-08 (illustrating that property owners seeking compensation for a
regulatory taking from a municipality must use an inverse condemnation action).
95. Id. at 124 ("There is no greater moral hazard problem associated with
regulatory takings than with other insurable municipal risks, like police misconduct,
employment discrimination, or automobile accidents.").
96. Id. at 110-11; see also Serkin, Big Differences, supra note 15, at 1665 ("Because
local governments discount the benefits and put a premium on the costs of their
actions, they will tend to underregulate as compared to risk-neutral governments.").
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Professor Berger is correct that there are significant problems with
fiscal illusion as a normative justification for requiring compensation
under the Fifth Amendment. Instead of inducing efficient investment
incentives, it is more likely to over-deter local governments. As a result,
Professor Berger responds by turning away from regulatory incentives
as an appropriate focus for regulatory takings and calling instead for a
renewed focus on fairness. 7 This is an entirely sensible move, and one
with which I am fundamentally sympathetic. But having raised the
problem of exaggeraLted costs, it is not so easy to dismiss. This zombie
is not so easily retired to its grave. Professor Berger's argument, after
all, does not challenge. the idea that governments are motivated by
cost. Instead, she challenges the possibility of any careful balancing by
governments because they will be too motivated by the costs of
compensation. While we can (and should) develop new normative
theories and argue for their adoption, the Takings Clause continues to
disincentivize regulatory action because the costs loom so large.
This is true despite the fact that governments rarely lose." Whether
a government is ultimately liable for a takings violation, litigation costs
alone can impose a significant financial burden on local governments
and raise the same inter-temporal mismatch that Professor Berger
identified.' Moreover, because of local officials' risk aversion, even if
the probability of takings liability is low, it may nevertheless have an
outsized effect on local decision making. In other words, Professor
Berger's criticisms of fiscal illusion raise problems that persist even if
fiscal illusion is rejected as ajustification for compensation.
Therefore, turning to fairness is no panacea. Instead, so long as
regulatory takings exist as a basis for liability, governments may underregulate and under-enforce existing regulations. There are, however,
some steps that are available to address perverse regulatory incentives
created by the risk of compensation.
The first, and most straightforward, is to make regulatory takings
insurance available to local governments. This could be done through
97. See Berger, supra note 1, at 37 (explaining that the economic dynamics at play
preclude regulatory incentives from inducing efficient government action regarding
land use).
98. SeeJames E. Krier & Stewart E. Sterk, An Empirical Study of Implicit Takings, 58
WM. & MARY L. REv. 35, 54-55, 88 (2016) (summarizing findings and concluding "our
survey demonstrates that in state court practice, relegation to ad hoc adjudication has
marked the death knell for a takings claim").
99. See Serkin, InsuringTakings Claims, supranote 30, at 78 ('just the litigation costs
alone of defending land use regulations can be exorbitant."); see also Ellen S. Pryor,
The Tort Liability Regime and the Duty to Defend, 58 MD. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999) (suggesting
that up to 41% of insurance costs are derived from defending against a claim).
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private insurers, municipal insurance pools, or through state
indemnification."oo The mechanism does not particularly matter for
purposes of the present discussion. What is important is that insurance
can address the. problem of inter-temporal mismatch that Professor
Berger identified by smoothing the costs of compensation awards and
overcoming local officials' risk aversion. As a result, it ensures that
local officials can more rationally calculate the expected costs and
benefits of any regulation. This is not assuming anything about how
local governments or local officials internalize the overall costs and
benefits of a regulation, but only suggesting that local officials will be
freed from the specter of adverse takings judgments when deciding
whether to regulate.
A second and more unorthodox response is to introduce a
countervailing pressure by awarding compensation for regulatory
inaction. 0' The problem, again, is that compensation awards will have
a disproportionate effect on government decision making; they will
not force governments to internalize the costs of their actions but will
instead serve as a heavy thumb on the scale against regulation. The
ideal way to respond is to remove that pressure, for example, by
extending insurance or just eliminating regulatory takings liability.
But there is another form of response: add a counterweight. If the
threat of compensation will discourage government officials from
regulating by magnifying the costs, that can be overcome either by
magnifying the benefits as well or by imposing costs for failing to act. 02
These responses take different forms but amount to the same idea.
Magnifying benefits could, theoretically, be accomplished through
the kind of "givings" mechanism described above."0 s Allowing
governments to levy fees to capture regulatory benefits would perfectly
address Professor Berger's symmetry concern as well as the problem of
inter-temporal mismatch. It would not sosmuch solve the problem as
create the equivalent problem on the opposite side of the ledger. It is
also quite outlandish as an actual proposal. Although the idea has been
in the literature for years, no court (or government) has taken it up.

100. For a more detailed treatment of possible insurance-based responses, see
Serkin, InsuringTakings Claims, supranote 30, at 131-36.
101. See generally Serkin, Passive Takings, supra note 15, at 346 (arguing that the
government's failure to regulate to protect property owners from dangers interfering
with their reasonable expectations of land may be unconstitutional and could require
compensation).
102. See id. at 362 ("Allowing the government to avoid internalizing those costs will
systematically favor inaction over action.").
103. See supra notes 63-64 and accompanying text.
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A more plausible response, at least doctrinally, is to counterbalance
the regulatory disincentive by making the government liable for failing
to act.1' This is an argument I considered at length in prior work, and
it is not as bizarre as it might seem. Creating affirmative duties on the
government has been part of the progressive constitutional agenda for
decades."o' Using property and the Takings Clause to accomplish this
goal is admittedly unusual and controversial, but it does not require
much of a doctrinal stretch to think that governments can-in some
circumstances-violate the Takings Clause by failing to change
existing regulations when property is threatened by some external
change in the world.'" In fact, property owners regularly sue local
governments for failing to rezone property.1 o7
For present purposes, the important observation is not simply that
the creation of omission liability is plausible; rather, that it responds in
Her
surprising ways to Professor Berger's symmetry argument.
of
balance
concern, again, is that the compensation requirement is out
with the slow recovery of regulatory benefits through increased
property taxes. Imposing liability for failing to act changes that
calculus, however, because avoiding those costs becomes a way of
capturing regulatory benefits. After all, avoiding costs that would
otherwise be due has the same effect as receiving a payment; costs
avoided amount to a payment received.os
Neither of these changes in the law would undermine or be
inconsistent with Professor Berger's focus on fairness. To say that
takings law should center primarily on distributional consequences
and ensure that disfavored individuals and groups are not singled out
for regulatory burdens does not mean ignoring regulatory incentives.
But these concerns do change the focus. Proponents of traditional
104. See Serkin, Passive Takings, supra note 15, at 362-63 (identifying the
relationship between passive takings and givings recapture).
105. See id. at 357-58 (citing Frank I. Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 TermForeword: On Protectingthe Poor Through the FourteenthAmendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7, 9
(1969) (arguing that the government has an affirmative duty to protect the poor from
dangers inherent to social inequality)); see also Charles A. Reich, The New Property, 73
YALE L.J. 733, 785 (1964) (asserting that individuals should have a right to certain
public benefits such as unemployment and insurance for the elderly).
106. See, e.g., Litz v. Md. Dep't of Env't, 131 A.3d 923, 931 (Md. 2016) (finding as a
matter of Maryland law that an inverse condemnation claim may stand based on
government's failure to act where it had an affirmative duty to act).
107. See Serkin, Passive Takings, supra note 15, at 376 n.147.
108. Id. at 363 ("[A]voiding liability is-aside from the baseline-conceptually
indistinguishable from receiving payment. Forcing the government to pay for forgone
benefits when it fails to act (i.e., passive takings liability) therefore amounts to allowing
the government to recover payment for the benefits of its actions.").
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fiscal illusion worry that failing to compensate for regulatory burdens
will induce inefficient over-regulation. Here, the critiques of fiscal
illusion suggest that paying compensation will result in inefficient
under-regulation. To the extent that fairness considerations will ever
compel regulatory takings liability, we must continue to worry that
governments will under-regulate and under-enforce existing
regulations. Municipal insurance and liability for passive takings help
to blunt those forces.
CONCLUSION

Professor Berger deserves credit for inventing a creative new weapon
to fight the theory of fiscal illusion. Her Article joins the crossbows
and chainsaws of existing external and internal critiques that have
been deployed to resist the argument that government must always
pay. Theorists have long pointed out that political costs, not fiscal
costs, are the ones that matter. The uneven distribution of costs and
benefits makes any compensation regime an imperfect check on
inefficient regulations. And fiscal illusion relies upon an implausible,
even bizarre, assumption that governments internalize costs and
benefits differently. Nevertheless, fiscal illusion keeps coming. Its
thirst for the blood of local governments, in particular, appears
insatiable, and so it continues to be invoked as a justification for
expansive takings protection.
Professor Berger argues that property taxes already create a
mechanism by which governments internalize costs and benefits. Not
only is compensation unnecessary to induce efficient regulatory
incentives, but it also over-deters local governments. She makes a
compelling argument, but it is unlikely to stop the fiscal illusion
zombie's advance. As a result, it is important to look to other responses
to the problem of over-deterrence. Municipal liability insurance and
takings for regulatory inaction turn out to be surprisingly powerful
responses. They are not rejoinders to fiscal illusion so much as
inoculation. At the least, they may serve to restore local officials'
incentives to evaluate regulatory risk rationally. And so they may clear
the way to allow for a renewed focus on other values, like fairness, that
should inform the constitutional protection of private property.

